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I
T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    n the fragile domain of computer network security, seconds can mean the 
difference between responding effectively to an incursion and sustaining 
devastating damage. Using those precious seconds is a job for machines, not 
humans. An autonomous computer system—defined as software that 
chooses particular actions without specific human pre-approval—can re-
spond quickly.1 However, reliance on machines has its perils, including en-
suring that machines that go beyond mere defense do so in compliance with 
applicable international law principles such as proportionality.2 Autonomous 
systems’ flaws—brittleness, bias, and unintelligibility—compound these 
challenges. 
Solving those challenges is important since proportionality is central in 
several contexts. First, in the jus ad bellum, self-defense must be tailored to 
the goal of stopping an adversary’s attacks.3 Second, in the jus in bello, the rule 
                                                                                                                      
1. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS 128 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0] 
(noting the speed of cyber exchanges); UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT 
RESEARCH, THE WEAPONIZATION OF INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES: 
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS AND CYBER OPERATIONS 4 (2017), https://www.uni-
dir.org/files/publications/pdfs/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-cyber-operations-en-
690.pdf (noting that as part of the 2015 “Grand Cyber Challenge” competition, the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency sought “[m]achines 
. . . to find and patch [software flaws] within seconds . . . and find their opponents’ weak-
nesses”); see also ROBIN GEISS, THE INTERNATIONAL-LAW DIMENSION OF AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS 9 (2015), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/11673.pdf (noting that 
the U.S. National Security Agency is allegedly working on software that will autonomously 
analyze data inputs and when necessary respond to cyber attacks from abroad); cf. PAUL 
SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF WAR 214–16 
(2018) (describing autonomous features of Stuxnet, a means allegedly designed and de-
ployed by the United States and Israel to insert a software flaw into the industrial control 
systems running centrifuges that were part of the Iranian nuclear program). 
2. Ashley Deeks, Noam Lubell & Daragh Murray, Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, 
and the Use of Force by States, 10 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY 1 
(2019); see also Alan Schuller, At the Crossroads of Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence 
in Autonomous Weapons Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARVARD NATIONAL 
SECURITY JOURNAL 379 (2017) (discussing autonomous systems and law of armed conflict). 
3. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 349. 
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of proportionality means that the harm to civilians expected cannot be ex-
cessive in light of the military advantage that the planner anticipates.4 Third, 
a State’s countermeasure in response to a violation of its sovereignty or a 
breach of the principle of nonintervention should center on persuading the 
responsible State to comply with its obligations.5 This article also argues that 
the duty to take feasible precautions—expressly stated in the jus in bello6—is 
inherent in all proportionality requirements, including those governing the 
jus ad bellum and countermeasures. 
Proportionality serves vital purposes. In the jus in bello, it limits harm to 
key interests, including the liberty, safety, and welfare of civilians and the 
integrity of civilian infrastructure. Proportionality in countermeasures also 
safeguards State interests, curbing a victim State’s impingements on a re-
sponsible State’s sovereignty after an incursion that may have involved lim-
ited impact. In requiring some fit between a response and an initial incursion, 
proportionality in the jus ad bellum and in countermeasures limits escalation. 
                                                                                                                      
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
5. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 128; Air Service Agreement of 27 March 
1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443, ¶ 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1978); Michael N. Schmitt, 
“Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 
54 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 697, 715 (2014). This article takes no po-
sition on whether respect for sovereignty per se is part of the backdrop of international law 
or instead constitutes a primary rule. Compare Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for 
Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1639, 1644–49 (2017) (suggesting that pro-
hibition on violations of sovereignty, particularly through incursions on territory of another 
State short of the actual use of force constitutes a primary rule of international law), with 
Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyberspace, 111 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 209–10 (2017) (arguing that respect for sovereignty is an 
overarching principle, rather than a basis for a separate rule barring incursions on sovereign 
territory when those incursions are too fleeting or marginal to constitute a use of force); see 
also Jeremy Wright, U.K. Attorney General, Address at Chatham House: Cyber and Inter-
national Law in the 21st Century (May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century (agreeing that respect for 
sovereignty per se is not a “specific rule” that exceeds the scope of the principle of non-
intervention); cf. Eric Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, 48 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 735, 741–42 (2017) (taking a middle 
position in the sovereignty per se debate, especially regarding the content of rules on terri-
torial incursions below the use of force threshold, and arguing that the question turns on 
the “domain and practical imperatives of states”). 
6. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 57(2)(a)(ii); Geoffrey S. Corn, War, Law, and 
the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary Measure, 42 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 419, 
459 (2015). 
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In the jus ad bellum and countermeasures contexts, this article argues that 
a victim State should receive a “margin of appreciation”—a measure of def-
erence—in crafting an answer to incursions by a responsible State.7 An un-
duly strict reading of proportionality can stifle victim States’ responses, cre-
ating a “first-mover” advantage when a State uses force unlawfully8 or 
breaches the principle of non-intervention.9 Regaining the initiative for vic-
tim States is particularly pressing in the cyber realm, where an initial attack 
can occur with great speed while engendering broad effects. Autonomous 
cyberagents can provide that necessary response capability.10 
An autonomous cyber agent is software that designers have set up to 
make and execute decisions without prior approval from human beings. 
Even though autonomous agents can act with a speed that humans cannot 
match, serious flaws mar autonomous agents’ performance. Autonomous 
agents lack contextual judgment and their reasoning can be “brittle,” since 
changing details in their inputs can spur arbitrary changes in outputs.11 Au-
tonomous models’ outputs can also be biased due to skewed inputs or faulty 
                                                                                                                      
7. The European Court of Human Rights has granted States a margin of appreciation 
in tailoring individual rights such as the right of free expression to each State’s society and 
culture. See Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, ¶ 51(ii) (1997) (ECtHR), http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58115. I suggest in this article that a similar concept has in-
formed development of the law of countermeasures, providing a victim State with a measure 
of flexibility—albeit flexibility within reasonable bounds—in crafting proportional counter-
measures. See Air Service Agreement, supra note 5, ¶ 83 (suggesting that assessing proportion-
ality in countermeasures necessarily involved an “approximation” of the scale of action by 
the victim State to induce the responsible State to comply with its obligations).  
8. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 331–35 (explaining that use of force in the 
cyber realm entails effects that are akin to kinetic actions in severity, immediacy, directness, 
and invasiveness). 
9. Some commentators have argued that the law of countermeasures is unduly restric-
tive, unduly burdening victim States’ responses. See Gary Corn & Eric Jensen, The Use of 
Force and Cyber Countermeasures, 32 TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOUR-
NAL 127 (2018). Ensuring that a countermeasure is an effective remedy—especially in the 
cyber domain—may require some streamlining and modest revision of legal requirements. 
For example, because time may be of the essence, States need flexibility in determining 
whether to provide a responsible State with notice of a pending countermeasure. See TAL-
LINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 120. 
10. See Deeks, Lubell & Murray, supra note 2, at 7–8. 
11. Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 CO-
LUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1851, 1877–78 (2019).  
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inferences from that data.12 In addition, those outputs can be unexplainable, 
crunching myriad variables in counterintuitive ways.13 Moreover, “automa-
tion bias” leads humans to exaggerate the accuracy of technology, even as 
technology often fails to deliver on its promise.14 
To address the flaws of autonomous cyberagents that would otherwise 
undermine compliance with the proportionality principle in international 
law, this article suggests that States must also take all feasible precautions to 
reduce harm to civilians, civilian objects, and sovereign interests. While in-
ternational law makes this duty express in the jus in bello, this article argues 
that the duty to take due care through feasible precautions is present in both 
the jus ad bellum and countermeasures.15 That duty is both substantive and 
evidentiary, with the substantive duty representing lex ferenda, and evidentiary 
component constituting lex lata. 
As a substantive matter, both the jus ad bellum and the law of counter-
measures are gradually moving toward an acknowledgment that due care is 
a component of proportionality, at least in the interdependent cyber domain. 
Reflecting this emerging duty, when a State engages in lawful self-defense 
against another State, unintended spillover effects on a third State’s networks 
arising from that action would constitute an unlawful use of force.16 Feasible 
precautions that would reduce that spillover are a logical implication of the 
jus ad bellum’s prohibition on the use of force. Similarly, the “interdependent 
nature” of networks makes due care a component of proportionality in coun-
termeasures.17 
In addition, feasible precautions are important from an evidentiary per-
spective as proof that a State has exercised the due care that proportionality 
requires. If a State has made feasible efforts to reduce the consequences of 
                                                                                                                      
12. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in 
Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROCEEDINGS OF MACHINE LEARNING RESEARCH 1 
(2018), https://perma.cc/8CX2-AMWM. 
13. Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability, at 4, ARXIV LABS, 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.03490.pdf (last revised Mar. 6, 2017). 
14. See Claudia E. Haupt, Artificial Professional Advice, 21 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
TECHNOLOGY 55, 71 (2019) (noting that humans reviewing an agent’s work—such as a 
medical diagnosis based on radiological imaging—may do only a cursory job because they 
believe the agent is virtually always correct). 
15. Consistent with this implication, Tallinn Manual 2.0 finds that States considering 
countermeasures must “exercise considerable care” in ensuring compliance with propor-
tionality. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 128. 
16. Id. at 333–34. 
17. Id. at 128. 
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its actions in cyberspace, external audiences—be they other States, tribunals, 
scholars, or nongovernmental organizations—will be more likely to find that 
any effects beyond strict proportionality are de minimis. To codify this natural 
tendency, feasible cyber precautions in the jus ad bellum and countermeasures 
should be regarded as a prerequisite for the margin of appreciation that a 
target State enjoys in these arenas. 
Because of the need for speed in the cyber realm, the timing of feasible 
precautions will be more flexible than in kinetic operations. In some cases, a 
State may need to plan feasible precautions before a specific incursion from 
another State. That is particularly important if the feasible precaution in-
volves training an autonomous agent. For example, gathering intelligence 
about an adversary may be a necessary component of such training. In addi-
tion, while a State may need to respond quickly to another State’s cyber in-
cursion, a State that has responded may be able to reduce needless damage 
after its response through assisting in the repair of damaged networks. The 
timing of required feasible precautions should be sufficiently flexible to in-
clude both pre-incursion and post-response measures. 
This article groups feasible precautions into four categories: reconnais-
sance, coordination, repairs, and review. Reconnaissance entails efforts to 
map an adversary’s network in advance of any incursion by that adversary, 
since time may be elusive after an incursion.18 On this view, acts of cyber 
espionage, such as the use of honey pots, are not merely permitted, but re-
quired, at least if they are feasible.19 Coordination requires that a cyberagent 
rely on more than one algorithm, machine, or sensor; often it will entail the 
interaction of multiple systems, including one or more that will keep watch 
on the primary agent. In addition, a State must, where feasible, assist in the 
repair of damage it has caused through a countermeasure, including second-
ary effects felt by third-party States. Where a responding State can provide a 
patch to address secondary effects, if feasible, it must. In the jus in bello, patch-
ing should reduce the net quantum of harm to civilian persons or objects 
                                                                                                                      
18. See id. at 128 (discussing mapping as a prelude to countermeasures, while also sug-
gesting that mapping will typically occur after the responsible State’s breach of duty that 
occasioned the possible countermeasure). 
19. A honey pot is a decoy file or other data asset that an entity designs to attract in-
truders and detect intrusions. If a user who has not received authorization gains access to 
the honey pot, the entity that set up the decoy can detect that unauthorized use. In addition, 
the entity can learn other information about the intruder’s methods that can also be helpful 
in conducting future probes of the intruder. See Amanda N. Craig, Scott J. Shackelford & 
Janine S. Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AMER-
ICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 721, 756 n.147 (2015). 
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ascribed to the attack in the proportionality calculus, and should play a sim-
ilar role in the jus ad bellum and countermeasures. Finally, planners must reg-
ularly review the performance in the field of autonomous cyberagents. 
These precautions will not ensure compliance with the principle of pro-
portionality in all cases involving autonomous cyberagents. But they will 
both promote compliance and provide States that take these precautions 
with a limited safe harbor, a margin of appreciation for effects that would 
otherwise violate the duty of proportionality in the jus ad bellum and counter-
measures. In the jus in bello, taking the measures described above would com-
ply with the rule of precautions in attack. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses cybersecurity and then 
segues into an in-depth account of autonomy, including both virtues, such 
as speedy response and analysis of multiple variables, and flaws, including 
unintelligibility, brittleness, and bias. Part III notes the principle of distinc-
tion and the rule of proportionality in the jus in bello, and then analyzes in 
greater detail the role of proportionality in the jus ad bellum and countermeas-
ures. It also discusses the rule of precautions in its express status under the 
jus in bello and its implied function as a component of proportionality in the 
other two bodies of law discussed here. Part IV discusses the categories of 
precautions outlined here: reconnaissance, coordination, repair, and review. 
This approach will maximize autonomy’s tactical strengths in the cyber arena 
while curbing the effects of autonomy’s flaws. Part V concludes. 
 
II. TWO CHALLENGING TECHNOLOGICAL ARENAS: CYBER AND AU-
TONOMY 
 
Both the cyber domain and autonomous systems feature new technological 
challenges and capabilities.20 This Part briefly outlines these issues. It stresses 
challenges facing autonomous systems to highlight the importance of legal 
rules to govern autonomous agents. 
 
A. Cyber Incursions: The Turn to a More Proactive Response 
 
The world increasingly relies on computer networks and the Internet for in-
formation, communication, and even acquiring essential goods and services. 
Without the Internet, both daily life and everyday governance would be far 
                                                                                                                      
20. On the challenges posed by new technologies, see Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of 
the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches, Butterflies, and Nanobots, 35 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 253, 257–58 (2014). 
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more difficult. As a result of this dependence, incursions on the Internet 
have taken center stage both in global affairs and military planning.21 
These incursions have taken a variety of forms. Among the most com-
mon are distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, where an actor uses 
masses of computers (botnets) to deluge websites with email or other com-
munications, effectively rendering those sites dysfunctional for some period 
of time.22 States and non-State actors also can launch malicious software 
(malware) that can exfiltrate data for purposes of identity theft, pilfering of 
intellectual property, or espionage.23 In another type of incursion, States and 
others can use malware to manipulate software or destroy data stored on 
other networks.24 In incursions such as Stuxnet (sometimes called Olympic 
Games), States or other actors can manipulate software to compromise in-
dustrial control systems (ICS), causing kinetic damage.25 For example, Russia 
launched coordinated information operations that used thousands of com-
puters to impersonate persons and groups on social media, spread misinfor-
mation, and influence democratic elections, most notably the 2016 U.S. pres-
idential campaign.26 
                                                                                                                      
21. See U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION, REPORT 8–16 (2020), https://www. 
solarium.gov/. 
22. See David A. Wallace & Christopher W. Jacobs, Conflict Classification and Cyber Oper-
ations: Gaps, Ambiguities, and Fault Lines, 40 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 643, 652 (2019). 
23. See U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 8–9. 
24. See Dan Effrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on 
Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 583, 620–23 (2018). 
25. In the Stuxnet episode, two States—reportedly the United States and Israel—intro-
duced malware into the ICS that ran the centrifuges used to process uranium for Iran’s 
nuclear program. As a result, the centrifuges overheated and had to be replaced, requiring 
much time, effort, and expense that set back the Iranian nuclear program. See Wallace & 
Jacobs, supra note 22, at 655–56. 
26. See U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 68; Michael N. 
Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International 
Law, 19 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2018); Sean Watts & Theodore 
T. Richard, Baseline Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace, 22 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 771, 
790 (2018) (discussing Russian efforts to use human trolls to influence Ukrainian elections); 
cf. Effrony & Shany, supra note 24, at 609–11 (discussing Russian hacking of the U.S. Dem-
ocratic Party as part of its election influence operations). 
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States have sought to develop timely and effective responses to these 
incursions. For example, the United States recently outlined a “defend for-
ward” component of its “persistent engagement” strategy.27 That strategy 
heralds a more proactive approach to parrying cyber incursions. As part of 
that strategy, U.S. cyber forces temporarily deprived a Russian government 
unit, the Internet Research Agency, of access to the Internet during the 2018 
U.S. election.28 That visible U.S. response is a powerful signal that victim 
States will not remain passive in the face of cyber incursions. 
 
B. Autonomy 
 
Since the broad outlines of cybersecurity have become widely known, this 
Section discusses the cyber domain’s companion: autonomy. It starts with a 
brief account of modes of autonomy, defined as artificial intelligence making 
substantive decisions that affect commerce, industry, domestic governance, 
and both conflict and competition between States—in other words, a broad 
swath of “human” endeavor. Further, the following subsection notes prob-
lems with autonomy, including brittleness, bias, and unintelligibility. 
 
1. Modes of Autonomy 
 
Autonomy involves models of artificial intelligence that draw inferences, dis-
cern patterns, and initiate actions based on machine learning.29 A computer 
designer trains the machine agent or “learner” on a large quantity of data, 
called a “training set.” The designer then tests the agent with a “test set” of 
                                                                                                                      
27. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CYBER STRATEGY 2018: SUMMARY (2018), 
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRAT-
EGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF; see also U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION, supra 
note 21, at 33–34. 
28. See Erica Borghard, Operationalizing Defend Forward: How the Concept Works to Change 
Adversary Behavior, LAWFARE (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/operationaliz-
ing-defend-forward-how-concept-works-change-adversary-behavior. 
29. PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM (2015); STUART J. RUSSELL & PE-
TER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2010); Peter 
Margulies, Making Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command Responsibility for Computer-Guided 
Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REMOTE WARFARE 405, 415–
31 (Jens David Ohlin ed., 2017); Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 
98 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1277, 1286–90 (2018); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, 
Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 UC DAVIS 
LAW REVIEW 653 (2017). 
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data inputs to determine if the training has enabled the agent to draw infer-
ences or assess patterns with sufficient precision to merit deployment in a 
particular task. Once the agent has performed the task in the field for some 
period, the designer reviews the agent’s performance to determine if modi-
fications to the agent’s training are necessary. 
There are many models of machine learning. Two useful examples are 
decision trees and artificial neural networks. Each is addressed in turn. 
Decision trees analyze data points in a choice between several possible 
actions.30 The decision tree shows the interplay of those factors in graphic 
terms, like leaves or branches in a diagram. Each leaf stands for a specific 
data point that has played a role in a particular decision.31 In a classic exam-
ple, a decision by a group of friends on waiting for a dinner table at a 
crowded restaurant might depend on factors such as the day of the week (on 
weekends, other restaurants might also be packed), the style of cuisine 
served, the time of the friends’ last meal, the weather (torrential rain would 
strengthen the case for staying put), and the comfort and availability of the 
restaurant’s bar (which could blunt the pain of waiting). To manage the large 
amounts of data that disparate variables can produce, a decision tree will 
generate an explanation that is as simple as possible, given the data, with 
leaves pruned away if they are unnecessary for prediction. For example, sup-
pose that our prospective diners cared less about the style of food than they 
did about their ability to amble up to the bar and secure the beverage of their 
choice. In that event, an autonomous agent would prune away the leaf rep-
resenting the restaurant’s high culinary rating. Because of its leaves, a deci-
sion tree’s reasoning is intelligible, facilitating review of inputs and outputs. 
While artificial neural networks lack the graphic, readily accessible out-
puts of decision trees, they are often more accurate than decision trees in 
detecting patterns in masses of data, including information from other au-
tonomous agents. The structure of neural networks resembles the human 
brain,32 which consists of neurons that are connected with countless vanish-
                                                                                                                      
30. This discussion relies on Peter Margulies, Surveillance by Algorithm: The NSA, Com-
puterized Intelligence Collection, and Human Rights, 68 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 1045, 1063–71 
(2016); see also Shin-Shin Hua, Machine Learning Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: 
Rethinking Meaningful Human Control, 51 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
117, 124–26 (2019) (discussing models of machine learning); see generally RUSSELL & 
NORVIG, supra note 29. 
31. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 29, at 757. 
32. Id. at 728. 
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ingly thin fibers. Neurons in an artificial network are connected through lay-
ers that perform particular facets of a task. Through that layered structure, 
the layers break down masses of data into manageable steps. 
Recently, research on neural nets has focused on “deep learning,” in 
which designers use many layers to analyze a broad spectrum of variables, 
sometimes called “dimensions.” While humans are limited in the dimensions 
they can grasp, machines do not labor under such constraints. For humans, 
scenes in everyday life occur in three dimensions: length, breadth, and depth. 
Pictorial representations occur in two dimensions—height and width—alt-
hough they may provide the illusion of depth. Similarly, most graphs plot 
points at the intersection of two axes, such as time and some measure of 
quantity or frequency.33 For human beings who cannot visualize beyond 
three dimensions, a deep learning agent’s inputs and outputs can be difficult 
to depict visually and grasp in operational terms. A graph of a deep learner’s 
outputs could have ten or twenty axes, instead of the two (one horizontal 
and one vertical) that appear in most graphs. Depicting that complex, inter-
active set of outputs in a fashion that humans can understand poses a special 
challenge. 
As an example, consider how a neural net would perform an increasingly 
common task for artificial intelligence: facial recognition. After designers in-
putted a very large training set, a neural net would analyze an even larger 
collection of photographs or videos depicting the human face in a range of 
angles and contexts. A neural net would subdivide its task, first searching for 
faces within a variety of objects and shapes in each photograph, which might 
also include full- or partial-body views, inanimate objects such as vehicles, 
and other living things such as trees or flowers. Other layers of the neural 
net would search for facial features, such as eyes and noses. Another layer 
would flag specific faces.34 
                                                                                                                      
33. See Geoffrey E. Hinton, Learning to Represent Visual Input, 365(1537) PHILOSOPHICAL 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, Jan. 12, 2010, at 177, 
180–83. 
34. See Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of 
Policy and Implementation Issues 17–18 (Lancaster University Mgmt. Sch., Working Paper No. 
2010/030, 2010), https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/49012/. The description in the text 
aims to explain how a neural net’s hidden layers work. It does not purport to offer an up-
to-date account of current developments in facial recognition technology, which are beyond 
the scope of this article. 
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At their best, autonomous agents can draw inferences quickly from 
masses of data that would take humans months or years to digest.35 Moreo-
ver, autonomous agents can spot patterns that would escape human detec-
tion. But autonomous agents have several significant flaws that require hu-
man acknowledgment and attention. These flaws are the subject of the next 
subsection. 
 
2. Autonomy’s Liabilities 
 
Despite their prodigious achievements and extraordinary promise, autono-
mous agents also suffer from significant deficits. For example, autonomous 
agents’ reasoning is “brittle” and lacks contextual judgment, prompting ma-
jor mistakes based on minor changes in inputs. Autonomous models can 
also exhibit bias, either because of problems with the inputs they receive 
from human developers in the course of training or because of flaws in their 
analysis of those inputs. In addition, autonomous agents produce outputs 
that are sometimes unintelligible or unexplainable, at least in conventional 
verbal terms. Moreover, an additional bias complicates all human efforts to 
review the outputs of autonomous agents: humans suffer from “automation 
bias”—a tendency to exaggerate the accuracy of technology.36 I discuss each 
in turn. 
 
a. Autonomy’s Brittle Disposition 
 
Many machine learning systems, such as neural networks, are brittle. While 
their outputs are often highly accurate, they can also make serious mistakes 
because of seemingly minor changes to the inputs they receive.37 Autono-
mous agents make such mistakes because they lack the contextual backdrop 
                                                                                                                      
35. See Ian S. Henderson, Patrick Keane & Josh Liddy, Remote and Autonomous Warfare 
Systems: Precautions in Attack and Individual Accountability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON RE-
MOTE WARFARE, supra note 29, at 335, 341. 
36. See Haupt, supra note 14, at 71. 
37. Bita Dervish Rouhani et al., Safe Machine Learning and Defeating Adversarial Attacks, 17 
IEEE SECURITY AND PRIVACY, Mar.-Apr. 2019, at 31, 31–32, https://ieeexplore.ieee. 
org/document/8677311 (noting that neural networks can mischaracterize minor changes in 
inputs, such as specks at the edges of a photo, as changing the actual subject of the photo, 
for example, treating a stop as a yield sign); Douglas Heaven, Why Deep-Learning AIs Are so 
Easy to Fool, NATURE, Oct. 9, 2019, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03013-
5 (noting that developers conducting experiments have found that rotating an object in an 
image so that the image contains a sideways or upside-down view materially reduces an 
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that even young children possess. Humans understand the context of images 
or other data, while machines often lack this holistic understanding. For hu-
mans, context determines which characteristics are most important in a given 
situation. For example, most human beings recognize the classic octagonal 
shape and red color of a stop sign, even if they cannot read the word “Stop” 
on the sign itself. The sign’s distinctive shape and color are part of a human 
being’s background understanding of context, which that person has learned 
from experience. In contrast, a neural network only knows context through 
the data that designers have fed it. That incomplete grasp of context can lead 
to arbitrary and seemingly random results. 
The familiar image of a stop sign illustrates the machine’s tendency to 
respond to minor changes in inputs with major, seemingly arbitrary changes 
in outputs. Consider the problem posed by so-called adversarial examples. 
Because a neural network’s understanding of context has so many gaps, com-
puter scientists have been able to prompt neural networks—including those 
trained to recognize text—to mistakenly classify a stop sign as a yield sign, 
simply by superimposing a few small white specks on a stop sign photo.38 
Humans alert to context would not take the bait; they would ignore the 
specks and focus on salient factors such as shape, color, and text that distin-
guish the stop sign from other road signs. As another example, a child who 
sees a photograph of a lion that is upside down will still recognize the image 
as portraying a lion, because based on his or her experience, the child recog-
nizes salient traits of the lion, such as its mane, teeth, and tail. However, a 
machine lacks that contextualized library of salient characteristics. For an 
autonomous agent, rotating an image may make the image appear to be dif-
ferent in kind, rather than merely in format. 
An autonomous agent lacks an inherent understanding of the difference 
between format and content. Children grasp that distinction in grade school 
when they submit a written homework assignment in a particular font and 
line spacing. Computers can learn the distinction, but only through exposure 
to training data. Their sense of context is thin and therefore subject to sub-
stantial volatility. That brittleness is a serious flaw. 
Developers often underestimate or fail to identify an agent’s gaps in con-
textual understanding. Socrates taught us more than two thousand years ago 
                                                                                                                      
agent’s ability to identify the object, even when the agent has successfully identified the 
object in the past).  
38. See Rouhani et al., supra note 37, at 32; see generally SCHARRE, supra note 1. 
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that much of wisdom is knowing what we do not know.39 But some failures 
of knowledge are difficult to detect precisely because humans tend to think 
that their knowledge is comprehensive and has no gaps—they do not know 
what they do not know. Developers who have spent countless hours training 
an autonomous agent also tend to overlook gaps in an agent’s knowledge. 
Similarly, humans are not very good at ascertaining what they know. Aspects 
of human understanding—including the mundane distinction between a 
stop sign and a yield sign—reflect inferences from data inputs that a designer 
will have to replicate in a machine to ensure that the machine can draw a 
similar inference. 
As an example of this gap between a developer’s inflated view of an 
agent’s knowledge and the agent’s actual knowledge of context, consider the 
following example from the healthcare field, where the use of autonomous 
agents has skyrocketed. Designers trained an agent to rank the urgency of 
treatment for patients with pneumonia, performing medical triage by priori-
tizing those at higher risk—patients who were likely to become seriously ill 
more quickly in the absence of treatment. The trained model classified pneu-
monia patients who also had asthma as being low risk, even though common 
sense would indicate that the combination of asthma—a serious respiratory 
disease in its own right—and pneumonia is a high-risk condition that requires 
immediate treatment.40 
In our pneumonia example, factual inputs led the model to incorrectly 
classify asthmatic pneumonia patients as low risk because doctors know the 
high risk of this combined condition and hence admit such patients directly 
to hospital intensive care units where patients promptly receive treatment. 
That prompt treatment then yields better clinical outcomes. In essence, the 
model mistook effects for causes, thereby drawing exactly the wrong lesson 
from the data. Exercising common sense, a layperson would have inferred 
that favorable outcomes for pneumonia patients with asthma were merely a 
beneficial effect of the accurate judgment that those patients posed a high risk. 
In contrast, the autonomous agent badly misread this effect of the high risk 
                                                                                                                      
39. See James Grimmelmann, Listeners’ Choices, 90 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW RE-
VIEW 365, 377 (2019) (discussing the views of ancient Greek philosopher Socrates and mod-
ern economist Kenneth Arrow on the consequences of human beings’ tendency to exhibit 
“partial ignorance,” including a person’s inability to accurately judge what he or she does 
not yet know). 
40. Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
LAW REVIEW 1311, 1336–37 (2019); Strandburg, supra note 11, at 1877–78.  
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of asthma as suggesting a causal relationship between the asthma itself and 
positive clinical outcomes. 
Reliance on this model without further investigation would have up-
ended appropriate treatment priorities. Yet researchers discovered this error 
only by sifting through the model’s outputs and comparing them with inputs. 
Once researchers discovered the error, they could feed the model additional 
data to properly discount asthma patients’ favorable outcomes. However, 
predicting all these gaps in advance is difficult, if not impossible. 
 
b. Bias and the Challenge of Inputting Optimal Data 
 
Bias is also an issue with machine learning and autonomous agents. Auton-
omous agents will not exhibit the emotions, such as anger or fear, which 
contribute to bias in human beings. Nevertheless, bias often seeps into au-
tonomous agents’ outputs. That invidious influence has several contributing 
causes, including, (1) human biases that affect the labeling and type of data 
that designers use to train agents, and, (2) shortcomings in inferences based 
on that data that can afflict both humans and machines.41 
As an example of the first cause of bias, consider supervised learning. 
Recall that in supervised learning, the machine learns from data that humans 
have already labeled. Since human beings are biased and often fail to recog-
nize their own biases, the labels created by human data workers may reflect 
bias along several axes, including race, class, religion, and nationality. Labeled 
data has attracted negative attention recently because some widely used la-
beled data sets, such as those for faces, seemingly have reflected the biases 
of the labelers.42 Identifying these biased labeled data sets and eliminating 
their discriminatory effects are key goals of current neural network develop-
ers. However, the problem is not that easy to solve. Consider unsupervised 
                                                                                                                      
41. See Ashley S. Deeks, Predicting Enemies, 104 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1529, 1563–65 
(2018); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 
1043, 1080–81 (2019). 
42. See Cade Metz, ‘Nerd,’ ‘Nonsmoker,’ ‘Wrongdoer’: How Might A.I. Label You?, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Sept. 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/arts/design/ima 
genet-trevor-paglen-ai-facial-recognition.html; Tom C.W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, 
and the Law, 88 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 531 (2019); see generally Sonia K. Katyal, Private Ac-
countability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA LAW REVIEW 54 (2019); Andrew D. 
Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 109, 133 (2017) (dis-
cussing problems of bias and incorrect or incomplete information that skew labeling data 
sets); Sandra Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2218, 2227–38 (2019). 
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learning, in which designers merely feed the machine vast amounts of unla-
beled data, leaving the machine to discern patterns and anomalies on its own. 
Here too, the types of data fed to the machine, as well as the ratio of different 
inputs, can reflect human biases.43 
The brittleness noted above can also foment bias. Suppose that agents 
trained to detect or monitor terrorism settle on superficial commonalities of 
some terrorists. For example, male terrorists who profess to follow Islam 
may well have facial hair, since that is one aspect of Islamic religious ob-
servance. That attribute obviously is an inaccurate metric for predicting ter-
rorism. It is underinclusive: domestic terrorism in the United States stems 
from white nationalist groups or others who are not Muslim and may be less 
likely to sport facial hair.44 The facial hair metric is also overinclusive: terror-
ism is a low-incidence event, and the overwhelming majority of male Mus-
lims with facial hair do not commit acts of terrorism.45 Reliance on the pres-
ence of facial hair is thus a poor metric for identifying terrorists. But a ma-
chine may not sort through all the data necessary to draw that conclusion, or 
may not receive that data from its human designers. 
The tendency to express bias can easily infiltrate the cyber realm. Auton-
omous cyberagents that have access to analyses of likely cyber culprits may 
infer that cyber threats come from particular States, such as Iran, which also 
trigger concern about terrorist threats. In a particular case, that inference 
may lead to the correct result. But a focus on Iran as the cyber culprit of 
choice would be markedly underinclusive. Cyber incursions also emanate 
from a host of other sources, including States such as China and Russia, non-
State armed groups, and criminal organizations.46 The information available 
to the agent may be incomplete or biased. It may then lead to mistaken at-
tributions by the agent, which in turn help drive errant autonomous re-
sponses to actual or potential cyber incursions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
43. See Mayson, supra note 42, at 2260. 
44. Cf. Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 379 
(2017) (discussing effect of stereotypes on the pattern of post-9/11 immigration detention). 
45. Cf. Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81 FORDHAM LAW 
REVIEW 1777, 1801 (2013) (summarizing social science evidence showing that terrorist acts 
are rare, “low-probability” events). 
46. See U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 10–14. 
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c. Explainability 
 
The most accurate autonomous agents also are the most difficult to explain. 
Neural networks are generally more accurate than other agents, such as de-
cision trees. But the engine of their accuracy also hinders their explainability. 
Neural networks are accurate because they use layers to sift through a wide 
array of variables. Reducing the outputs of that layered analysis into a con-
ventional verbal explanation is difficult.47 That difficulty can conceal the 
causes of an inaccurate or biased output.48 There are several methods for 
understanding that causation, including posing counterfactuals to the ma-
chine and seeing if they change the outputs.49 Still, explainability poses a vex-
ing issue for autonomous agents, and while scientists are working to develop 
approaches to reaching this goal, challenges remain. 
 
d. Automation Bias: The Machines Know Best 
 
A review of an agent’s outputs is also difficult because of humans’ automa-
tion bias.50 In both operational interfaces with agents in the course of a mis-
sion and review of the mission’s effectiveness, humans tend to defer unduly 
to machines.51 Operating in exigent settings such as piloting aircraft, human 
collaborators with autonomous agents tend to become complacent about the 
                                                                                                                      
47. See Lipton, supra note 13, at 4; Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an 
Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 1389, 1439 (2019) (noting that the number 
of variables that neural networks process impedes verbal explanations); see also DAVID FREE-
MAN ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 28–29 (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf (suggesting that government en-
forcement personnel using machine learning to spot illegal conduct in complex arenas such 
as securities markets may ask what inputs have prompted an autonomous agent to flag a 
particular individual or firm as a risk); cf. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 29, at 692 (noting that a 
developer can often discern “how important different input variables were to the predic-
tions generated [made by the agent] and how changes in the input variables tend to be trans-
lated into changes in the outcome variable”). 
48. DOMINGOS, supra note 29, at 239. 
49. In other words, a designer would vary the inputs to the agent, and determine the 
effect of each such change on the agent’s results. See Lipton, supra note 13, at 6; Lehr & 
Ohm, supra note 29, at 692. 
50. See Haupt, supra note 14, at 71. 
51. See M. L. Cummings, Human Supervisory Control Challenges in Network Centric Operations, 
at 4, HUMAN AND AUTONOMY LABS: PUBLICATIONS (2005), https://hal.pratt.duke.edu/ 
sites/hal.pratt.duke.edu/files/u13/Human%20Supervisory%20Control%20Chal-
lenges%20in%20Network%20Centric%20Operations%20.pdf. 
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agent’s performance. If an agent makes a mistake, this complacency hinders 
the human collaborator’s ability to recognize and rectify the error.52 For ex-
ample, in the Boeing 737 Max crashes, it appears that the pilots had difficulty 
in pivoting from reliance on the agent’s navigation decisions to regaining 
human control over the aircraft.53 
Moreover, evidence suggests that designers of the aircraft’s human-ma-
chine interface paid insufficient attention to human habits and response 
times.54 Similar problems occur with reviews of agents’ outputs. Humans 
may assume that machines have made correct decisions, and may be less 
willing to probe as deeply as a comprehensive review would require. Relat-
edly, humans may not design or deploy autonomous agents to provide opti-
mal aid in this task. 
 
C. Summary 
 
Cyber and autonomy are extraordinarily powerful technologies that can im-
prove human performance. But each has vulnerabilities and deficits. Design-
ers of autonomous cyberagents need to be aware of those flaws. In addition, 
legal regimes for governing autonomous cyberagents have to display similar 
awareness. The next Part aids in that task by providing an overview of inter-
national law principles applicable to the autonomous cyber domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
52. See Jin Zhou et al., The Impact of Different Levels of Autonomy and Training on Operators’ 
Drone Control Strategies, 8(4) ACM TRANSACTIONS ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION, Oct. 
2019, at 22:1, 22:13, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3344276 (discussing human-ma-
chine interaction in drone piloting, including how differences in human training appeared 
to influence human inclination and ability to make real-time adjustments to navigation path 
determined by automated software). 
53. See Chris Hamby, How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried,’ NEW YORK 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/business/boeing-737-acci-
dents.html. 
54. Id. 
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III. AUTONOMY, CYBER, AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
In the realms of cyber and autonomy, international law applies.55 Interna-
tional law includes proportionality in the jus ad bellum, jus in bello, counter-
measures, and human rights.56 Cyber and autonomy may require modest re-
visions in international law rules relevant to kinetic or other means of action 
and response. Before addressing the need for further elaboration or revision, 
we first should outline the relevant international law rules. This Part reviews 
the relevant rules on proportionality in the jus ad bellum, countermeasures, 
and the jus in bello. I also address the jus in bello rule of precautions in attack 
and suggest that some version of that rule applies in the jus ad bellum and 
countermeasures. 
 
A. Distinction, Lethal Weapons, and the Cyber Domain 
 
While the analysis of proportionality here does not directly address the core 
jus in bello principle of distinction, clarification of that fundamental principle 
is a useful first step. The principle of distinction bars the targeting of civilians 
in an armed conflict.57 Much of the controversy about autonomy in armed 
conflict has stemmed from concern that autonomy poses tensions with this 
principle.58 Using computers to make targeting decisions with little or no 
                                                                                                                      
55. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 127 (discussing the application of the 
international law of countermeasures to the cyber domain); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Ad-
visor, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Con-
ference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012), https://2009-2017.state. 
gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm; Brian Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyber-
space, 35 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 177 (2017); Paul C. Ney, Jr., 
General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, DOD General Counsel Remarks at U.S. 
Cyber Command Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/News-
room/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-com-
mand-legal-conference/; Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 317 (2015); Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare 3.0: Protecting 
the Civilian Population During Cyber Operations, 101 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 333, 334 (2019) (noting “broad consensus that IHL . . . applies to cyber operations 
during an armed conflict”). 
56. This article leaves the important issue of proportionality and human rights for an-
other day. See Margulies, supra note 30. 
57. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 48, 51(2). 
58. See Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner & Matthew Waxman, Adapting the Law of 
Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapons Systems, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 386, 401–
05 (2014); Marco Sassòli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, 
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 308 
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real-time human ability to veto those decisions could result in substantial 
noncompliance.59 
For example, suppose that an autonomous agent mistakenly “learned” 
through inputted data that it was permissible to attack civilians, or drew un-
reasonable inferences in identifying a civilian as a direct participant in hostil-
ities subject to targeting.60 Acting on these mistakes would pave the way for 
                                                                                                                      
(2014); Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapons 
Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231 (2013). 
Critics of the use of autonomous weapons in armed conflict have outlined comprehensive 
concerns about compliance with the jus in bello and have urged a ban on development of 
such weapons. See Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions), Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) (warning that autonomous agents 
do not exhibit “compassion”); Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapons Systems: Human 
Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 687 (2012) (asserting that use of autonomous agents in targeting 
during armed conflict may diminish regard for human life). Other scholars have argued that 
the critics’ concerns are misplaced or exaggerated. See e.g., Chris Jenks, False Rubicons, Moral 
Panic, and Conceptual Cul-De-Sacs: Critiquing and Reframing the Call to Ban Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons, 44 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 1 (2016). 
59. Compliance with the principle of distinction is a more or less pressing issue de-
pending on the precise nature and purpose of the particular system at issue. See U.S. De-
partment of Defense, Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 13, 14 (2012, in-
corporating Change 1, May 8, 2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Docu-
ments/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf (defining an autonomous system as one that 
“once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human op-
erator” and noting that some systems “allow human operators to override [autonomous] 
operation”); see also Tim McFarland, The Concept of Autonomy 24 (2020) (unpublished 
paper on file with NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) (discussing 
conceptions of autonomy). Autonomous weapons do not necessarily target humans and 
may be stationary and purely defensive in character. For example, the U.S. Navy has long 
used fixed autonomous weapons to identify and repel enemy missiles approaching naval 
vessels. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 65–66 (2014), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-
26-28-march-2014. These fixed defensive applications do not raise the same concerns as 
mobile offensive systems about compliance with IHL. The U.S. Navy is also developing 
autonomous swarming technology for offensive naval operations that the Navy could at 
some point use for targeting, although the rules for these systems currently require human 
supervision. 
60. Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Ele-
ments, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 697, 
699 (2010); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 641, 643–44 (2010). 
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violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). An autonomous agent’s 
unreasonable decision to use lethal force in an armed conflict would consti-
tute a major challenge to IHL’s traditional balance of humanity and military 
necessity.61 
Analyzing autonomous agents’ compliance with IHL in the cyber realm 
mutes, but does not eliminate the concerns raised by the prospect of agents’ 
violation of the principle of distinction in kinetic operations.62 Operations in 
the cyber domain do not entail direct targeting of persons. Accordingly, con-
cerns about the mistaken or unreasonable use of lethal force are less com-
pelling. Still, such concerns are still relevant. Cyber attacks on civilian sites, 
such as hospitals, schools, or traffic systems, could cause considerable bodily 
harm to civilians, as well as damage to civilian objects.63 Any comprehensive 
legal regime for autonomous cyberagents must address those issues. 
 
B. Cyber and Proportionality 
 
Violations of the rule of proportionality by autonomous cyberagents in the 
jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and countermeasures contexts can cause harm to 
civilians or civilian objects that is excessive or simply needless in light of 
those cyberagents’ legitimate purposes. For example, as suggested above, in 
an armed conflict an autonomous cyberagent may engage in lawful targeting 
of a software operating system developed for use by an adversary’s military, 
but in the process may also cause damage to different civilian systems that is 
foreseeable and excessive in light of the military advantage expected from 
the underlying attack.64 Similarly, outside armed conflict, an autonomous 
cyberagent might take a countermeasure in response to another State’s inter-
ference. However, the countermeasure might entail effects on the adversary 
State’s sovereign rights that were too far reaching to comply with propor-
                                                                                                                      
61. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian 
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795, 796 
(2010). 
62. Duncan B. Hollis, Autonomous Legal Reasoning in International Humanitarian Law, 30 
TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 1, 10–11 (2016). 
63. See Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen Nowlan, 
William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 817, 
848 (2012). 
64. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 128 (noting potential for disproportion-
ate harm in countermeasures caused by the “interconnected and interdependent nature of 
cyber systems”). 
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tionality. For these reasons, proportionality’s impact on the use of autono-
mous cyberagents matters, even if the core jus in bello principle of distinction 
is not directly in play. 
 
1. Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality 
 
Proportionality in the jus ad bellum governs a State’s use of force in self-de-
fense against an armed attack.65 In the cyber realm, the State that has suffered 
an armed attack must first apply the threshold criterion of necessity, asking 
whether force—as opposed to use of passive means such as firewalls or ac-
tive measures such as DDoS incursions that do not rise to the level of 
force—is reasonably required to defeat the attack.66 
Once a victim State has found that the use of force in self-defense is 
necessary, it assesses proportionality. Proportionality under the jus ad bellum 
has both functional and quantitative aspects. On a functional level, propor-
tionality asks whether a reasonable person would view the “scale, scope, du-
ration, and intensity” of the force used in self-defense as tailored to the pre-
vention of further attacks.67 Quantitatively, there will often be some relation 
in scale, duration, and intensity between an armed attack and force used in 
self-defense.68 Those planning the use of force should consider both effects 
on the initial attacker and collateral impacts on other States, entities, and 
interests.69  
 Assessing collateral impact is crucial for autonomous cyberagents, given 
the interconnectedness of the Internet.70 Responses that are necessary and 
proportionate for a country that has engaged in an armed attack may well be 
unnecessary and disproportionate if those responses spill over into other 
                                                                                                                      
65. See id. at 340–44. 
66. Id. at 348–49. 
67. See id. at 349 (asserting that proportionality limits responses to those “required to 
end the situation that has given rise to the right to act in self-defence”). 
68. See Enzo Cannizaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in 
the Lebanese War, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 779, 784 (2006) (noting 
that “[a] state acting in self-defence . . . [should] maintain a certain level of correspondence 
between the defensive conduct and the attack which prompted it”). 
69. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 93, ¶ 194 (June 27); id. at 269–70, ¶¶ 7, 9; 362–70, ¶¶ 201–14 
(dissenting opinion by Schwebel, J.). 
70. See RAIN LIIVOJA, MAARJA NAAGEL & ANN VALJATAGA, NATO COOPERATIVE 
CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, AUTONOMOUS CYBER CAPABILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2019), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/07/Autonomy-in-Cyber-
Capabilities-under-International-Law_260619-002.pdf. 
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countries not responsible for the attack. In the kinetic domain, it often may 
be relatively straightforward to restrict a kinetic response to a particular 
country. For example, a missile strike in self-defense by Arcadia could target 
military objectives in Ruritania, if the latter country had engaged in an armed 
attack on Arcadia. Arcadia’s strike on Ruritania would generally not affect 
the third country of Pacifica. However, in the interconnected world of the 
Internet, in which Pacifica individuals and entities may use servers located in 
Ruritania, such precision can be more difficult to achieve. The result may be 
serious impacts on the sovereign interests of Pacifica and other third-party 
States. 
On the other hand, the need for speed in the cyber domain may require 
greater flexibility in defining both necessity and proportionality. In particular, 
those concepts should not rigidly require the passage of time between an 
initial attack by the responsible State and the victim State’s response. In the 
cyber realm, a waiting period of hours or even minutes could mean the dif-
ference between preserving the victim State’s critical infrastructure and leav-
ing the victim State helpless. Suppose that Ruritania launches an all-out cyber 
attack on Arcadia’s power grid. In this situation, Arcadia may lack the time 
for a digital forensic investigation to determine whether its passive measures, 
such as firewalls, have thoroughly blocked Ruritania’s attack. Similarly, Ar-
cadia may not have time to ponder whether measures below the use of force 
threshold will persuade Ruritania to cease its attacks. 
In other situations, Arcadia may have the necessary time to assess 
whether passive measures or countermeasures will adequately address the 
threat. For example, suppose that Arcadian officials detect phishing emails 
sent by Ruritanian agents to employees who inspect and maintain ICS at an 
Arcadian power plant. Those phishing emails contain malware that Arcadia 
believes could disable the plant’s ICS and therefore do serious physical dam-
age to the plant’s machinery. In this situation, Arcadia will have time to re-
quire the power company to conduct a sweep of its network and send out 
an emergency notice to its employees to apprise them of the threat and re-
frain from opening messages that seem suspicious. In this situation, the im-
mediate use of force by Arcadia against Ruritania would be neither necessary 
nor proportionate. 
Read against this shifting factual backdrop, Tallinn Manual 2.0’s discus-
sion of necessity and proportionality provides victim States with the flexibil-
ity they need without giving them unbounded license in their response. While 
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it is true that the Manual’s ad bellum discussion of the need to assess the effi-
cacy of passive defenses and countermeasures71 may imply a specific time 
sequence in which assessment follows attack, that is not the only possible 
reading of this passage. As we will see in the next Section, in some situations 
a State should be able to calibrate its autonomous cyberagents to detect an 
all-out attack and respond accordingly. In these situations, the victim State 
should be able to flip the conventional time sequence of attack followed by 
a necessity and proportionality assessment, and instead rely on a prior “beta 
test” of its passive defenses and active below-the-force-threshold options. 
In this situation, requiring a victim State to comport with the conventional 
time sequence might mean that the victim State would lose the ability to 
respond at all—a result that no State would agree to and that international 
law does not require. Tallinn Manual 2.0’s discussion should not be read to 
mandate this outcome.72 
In addition, as discussed later in this Section, a victim State is entitled to 
a measure of deference or a margin of appreciation in responding to a series 
of “pinprick” attacks in the cyber realm.73 Consider a series of phishing at-
tacks by Ruritania on various sensitive government agencies in Arcadia. As-
sume that those attacks could have kinetic consequences if the malware that 
Ruritania had implanted in its phishing emails had invaded Arcadian govern-
ment networks. In response, Arcadia would not be limited to individual at-
tacks that mimicked the Ruritanian incursions. Instead, Arcadia would be 
allowed to use force equal to a discrete increment beyond the aggregation of 
Ruritania’s attacks, as long as that additional increment was reasonable. As-
suming digital data or intelligence showed that the Ruritanian attacks were 
related, permitting Arcadia to aggregate the impacts of Ruritania’s attacks 
would be consistent with proportionality.74 
Permitting an additional increment beyond the cumulative impact of Ru-
ritanian attacks would allow Arcadia to mount a robust response and ensure 
that Ruritania accrued no lasting tactical or strategic advantage. In contrast, 
given the interdependent nature of cyber networks, confining Arcadia to a 
                                                                                                                      
71. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 349. 
72. If Tallinn Manual 2.0 were to be read in this narrow way, its guidance would unduly 
restrict the options available to victim States under the jus ad bellum. 
73. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 342, 342 n.823. 
74. Id. at 342. But see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 230–
31 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that at least one State has taken this aggregate approach, while 
other authorities believe that pinprick attacks must be escalating in scale to allow a State to 
go beyond the force necessary to repel any particular attack). 
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response to individual pinprick attacks or even to a rigidly demarcated ag-
gregate would, in practice, force Arcadia to stay below the level of aggregate 
impacts. Restricting Arcadia to an aggregate would have that practical effect 
because an attempt to achieve a precise aggregate in an interconnected online 
world could well overshoot the mark. Allowing a victim State a margin of 
appreciation beyond the attacking State’s aggregate impacts would ensure 
that the responsible State’s violations of international law did not place the 
victim State at a permanent disadvantage. 
But even with the ability to aggregate impacts and a margin of apprecia-
tion in that calculation, proportionality would still impose limits on the vic-
tim State’s cyber response. For example, suppose Ruritania has attacked an 
ICS in an Arcadian defense plant and damaged plant machinery. Since Ruri-
tania’s attack had kinetic consequences, Arcadia could respond in self-de-
fense. 
Arcadia’s response could include attacks on the ICS of a Ruritania de-
fense plant. To the extent that a quantitative test for jus ad bellum proportion-
ality applies, this response would match the Ruritanian incursion. Indeed, an 
attack on the ICS of multiple Ruritanian defense plants would be within Ar-
cadia’s margin of appreciation. So would a targeted temporary power outage 
or a cyber takedown limited to the Ruritanian military. 
However, without a broader Ruritanian attack, an Arcadian response that 
aimed to destroy the Ruritania power grid as a whole would be dispropor-
tionate. Such a response would exceed any quantitative test for just ad bellum 
proportionality and also go beyond what was reasonably necessary to deter 
further attacks. This reading of the jus ad bellum proportionality principle 
would limit escalation and keep disputes, to the extent possible, within the 
cyber realm, thereby curbing spillover into the kinetic realm. 
 
2. Proportionality and Countermeasures 
 
This brings us to proportionality in countermeasures. Countermeasures are 
responses by a victim State to another State’s violations of international law.75 
Typically, countermeasures are temporary76—a factor that this article views 
as related to proportionality. Moreover, countermeasures have often entailed 
notice to the responsible State, although the notice requirement is flexible 
                                                                                                                      
75. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 116–17. 
76. Id. at 119. 
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enough to respond to the dictates of practicality.77 Under current under-
standings of international law, countermeasures are not available against a 
non-State actor. Still, a State can target civilian networks—subject to pro-
portionality requirements—in the interest of persuading the responsible 
State to desist.78 Countermeasures are not available in collective self-defense, 
and must be below the level of an armed attack.79 
In international law regarding countermeasures, proportionality takes 
into account both a functional aspect—the role of the countermeasure in 
inducing the responsible State to “comply with its obligations”—and a quan-
titative aspect—matching the countermeasure with the importance, scale, 
and duration of the initial action that prompted the countermeasure.80 More 
than in the jus ad bellum, function and fit are independent criteria. That is, a 
given countermeasure may be unlawful because it exceeds the importance of 
the initial action—including its impact on sovereignty—as well as the initial 
action’s scale and duration, even though the countermeasure was necessary to 
induce the responsible State to fulfill its duties.81 
At the same time, a key arbitral decision on countermeasures recognizes 
that the fit of a countermeasure need not be precise down to the last decimal 
point.82 As the arbitral tribunal noted in the Air Service case, “judging the 
‘proportionality’ of counter-measures is not an easy task and can at best be 
accomplished by approximation.”83 In practice, the willingness to engage in 
                                                                                                                      
77. Id. at 120. 
78. Id. at 112–13. 
79. Id. at 125–26. Many experts believe that a State cannot employ countermeasures 
above the threshold for the use of force. Id. Most States place the use of force at a lower 
threshold than an armed attack, although the United States believes the two are identical. 
Id. at 126. Countermeasures also may not violate fundamental human rights or jus cogens. Id. 
at 123; Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace, 
103 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 565, 577–78 (2018). 
80. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 128; Report of the International Law Commis-
sion to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 135, cmt. ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, cmt. 
at 135, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Draft Articles of 
State Responsibility]; Air Service Agreement, supra note 5, at 443–44, ¶ 83; Schmitt, supra note 5, 
at 715. 
81. See Draft Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 80, at 135, cmt. ¶ 7 (noting that “in 
every case a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, including the 
importance of the issue of principle involved . . . partly independent of the question whether 
the countermeasure was necessary to achieve the result of ensuring compliance”). 
82. Air Service Agreement, supra note 5, at 443–44, ¶ 83; Draft Articles of State Responsibility, 
supra note 80, at 134, cmt. ¶ 3. 
83. Air Service Agreement, supra note 5, at 443–44, ¶ 83. 
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approximation means that the victim State receives a measure of defer-
ence—in international law, what is often called a margin of appreciation as 
referred to earlier84—in crafting a countermeasure.85 
The Air Service arbitral decision illustrates how this margin of apprecia-
tion works. In Air Service, against the backdrop of an international air 
transport compact between France and the United States, France refused to 
let a U.S. air carrier downsize to a smaller plane in London for a flight that 
originated in San Francisco and ended in Paris. France alleged that downsiz-
ing in the territory of a third State was contrary to the agreement. In response 
to the French refusal, the United States threatened to block all Air France 
flights from Paris to Los Angeles. The French then agreed to let the flights 
to Paris continue pending the arbitral decision. The arbitral tribunal ruled 
that the U.S. threat to discontinue Air France flights from Paris to Los An-
geles was not “clearly disproportionate,” even though the U.S. threat in-
volved all air traffic, while the French only sought to block flights to Paris 
that involved a plane that was smaller than the aircraft used for the U.S.-
London portion of the flight route.86 
A fair reading of Air Service suggests that the victim State—the United 
States—receives a measure of deference for its chosen countermeasures. On 
this view, it is sufficient for a countermeasure to reflect an approximation of 
the initial action’s impact and the response needed to encourage compli-
ance.87 The tribunal’s telling term, “approximation,” only makes sense if the 
countermeasure exceeds the impact of the initial action since, by definition, a 
countermeasure that is clearly less impactful than the initial action would 
comply with proportionality. 
                                                                                                                      
84. Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, ¶ 51(ii) (1997) (ECtHR), http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58115 (noting that despite the protection of free speech, the 
Court upheld the criminal conviction of an official who used the phrase “national liberation 
movement” to describe a Kurdish group that Turkey had designated as a terrorist organiza-
tion); Robert D. Sloane, Human Rights for Hedgehogs?: Global Value Pluralism, International Law, 
and Some Reservations of the Fox, 90 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 975, 983 (2010). 
85. See MICHAEL A. NEWTON & LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 183 (2014) (asserting that proportionality in countermeasures involves a “rough con-
textual approximation” based on the judgment of “policymakers acting in light of the infor-
mation and assessments reasonably available to them to inform good-faith decision-mak-
ing”); see also id. at 186 (describing proportionality in countermeasures as “prohibition against 
excesses rather than a requirement for equivalence”). 
86. Air Service Agreement, supra note 5, at 443–44, ¶ 83. 
87. Id. 
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The Air Service tribunal may have taken this view because requiring a pre-
cise fit—not merely an approximation—between an initial violation and a 
countermeasure would have relegated victim States to responses that were 
less impactful than the initial action. Since a precise fit is hard to achieve, a 
victim State seeking to comply with international law under a precise-fit 
standard would need to set its response at a level lower than the initial action. 
In many situations, such a threadbare countermeasure would be manifestly 
inadequate to induce the responsible State to comply with its duties. Ensur-
ing that a countermeasure is not a futile exercise thus requires a measure of 
deference for the victim State. Similar logic should govern in the cyber realm. 
Even with an appropriate margin of appreciation, a suitably “commen-
surate” countermeasure should not interfere with an interest that is markedly 
more important than the interest that the initial action of the responsible 
State impaired.88 Here, too, the Air Service decision is a useful guide. The U.S. 
countermeasure of threatening a halt to Air France’s Paris-Los Angeles 
flights possessed “some degree of equivalence” with France’s initial action 
in barring changes in the size of planes for the London-Paris leg of U.S.-
France air routes.89 Both the initial action by France and the U.S. counter-
measure concerned the regulation of international commercial air travel. A 
U.S. response that disrupted internal French law enforcement, communica-
tions, or financial networks would arguably have targeted a French interest 
more important than the United States’ interest in avoiding snarls in interna-
tional air travel. That hypothetical U.S. countermeasure would thus have 
been disproportionate. 
A disparity in the importance of interests affected may have also con-
tributed to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case.90 In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, Czechoslovakia 
responded to Hungary’s refusal after the fall of the Iron Curtain to imple-
ment a Warsaw Pact-era bilateral treaty on damming the Danube River. 
Czechoslovakia’s countermeasure entailed unilateral action to “assume con-
trol” of the “shared resource” of this great river and divert the Danube’s 
waters from Hungary.91 That Czech action, if permitted to remain in effect, 
                                                                                                                      
88. See Draft Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 80, at 135, cmt. ¶ 6. 
89. Air Service Agreement, supra note 5, at 443–44, ¶ 83. 
90. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (Sept. 
25). 
91. Id. at 56, ¶ 85. 
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would have deprived Hungary of its entitlement to an “equitable and reason-
able share” of the Danube’s natural resources.92 The Czech fiscal interests 
affected by Hungary’s refusal to honor the earlier agreement were far less 
important than the Hungarian riparian rights that the Czech countermeasure 
would have harmed. 
On the other hand, an initial action’s impact on a victim State’s election 
integrity would rise to the foremost level of importance. Suppose, as the U.S. 
intelligence community has concluded, that Russia engaged in massive Inter-
net-based efforts to sway U.S. voters during the 2016 election that relied 
heavily on deception, including fake Twitter and Facebook accounts.93 Fur-
ther assume that Russia sought to undermine the legitimacy of the 2018 U.S. 
congressional election results by using its Internet acolytes—human and ma-
chine—to spread false information about the outcome. Given the place of 
elections in democratic governance, interference of this type would impinge 
on a vitally important interest. The United States apparently responded to 
these Russian actions with a DDoS attack that put a key Russian government 
entity offline.94 The reported U.S. action against a Russian agency believed 
to have been responsible for web-based election interference clearly did not 
exceed the importance of election integrity, which Russia had sought to un-
dermine. 
In addition to the importance of the interests that a countermeasure ef-
fects, a countermeasure should be temporary and reversible. The Draft Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility make duration a criterion separate and distinct 
from proportionality, asserting that countermeasures are limited to acts or 
omissions that, (1) clash with the victim State’s duties under international 
law, and, (2) operate “for the time being” in order to induce compliance by 
the responsible State.95 In addition, the Draft Articles indicate that, where 
possible, countermeasures shall not irreversibly disrupt the status quo; ra-
ther, a victim State should take countermeasures in “a way . . . [that will] 
permit the resumption of performance” of the victim State’s duties.96 A 
                                                                                                                      
92. Id. 
93. See Schmitt, supra note 26. 
94. See Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian 
Troll Factory on Day of 2018 Midterms, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 27, 2019, https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyber-command-operation-disrupted-in-
ternet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-
36d6-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html. 
95. Draft Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 80, art. 49(2). 
96. Id. art. 49(3). 
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countermeasure that fundamentally alters the relationship between the re-
sponsible and victim State will block such a “resumption of performance” 
of duties under international law, and thus will exceed a countermeasure’s 
permissible dimensions. 
Consider again the ICJ’s decision in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros. The water-di-
version project that the Czech Republic had begun after Hungary’s repudia-
tion was far-reaching, with an impact on Hungary’s riparian rights that would 
have been long lasting and virtually impossible to reverse. As the ICJ ob-
served, a vital concern in Czechoslovakia’s unilateral diversion of the Dan-
ube was the “continuing effects of the diversion . . . on the ecology” of Hun-
gary’s riparian region.97 While the Court framed these effects as part of its 
finding that Czechoslovakia’s response was not proportional, the Court’s 
discussion of the Czechoslovakian response of “continuing effects” on Hun-
gary’s ecological systems suggests that duration and proportionality often go 
together.98 Common sense indicates that “continuing effects” on sensitive 
ecological systems often will be lasting. Given the difficulty of reversing such 
effects, it makes sense to integrate duration into the proportionality calculus. 
In the cyber realm, the durational limitation suggests that a DDoS attack 
would generally comply with proportionality in countermeasures. A DDoS 
attack does not destroy functionality or require replacing hardware or soft-
ware, and hence remains below the use of force threshold. For the same 
reason, a DDoS attack is reversible; once it stops, the network returns to its 
prior level of functioning. Moreover, DDoS attacks do not destroy data; they 
just make data on a network—like the network itself—more difficult to ac-
cess for some period of time. 
However, the durational criterion suggests that classifying a DDoS attack 
as a proportionate countermeasure is both over- and under-inclusive. First, 
a DDoS attack has no built-in time limit. With a large enough botnet, an 
adversary can continue a DDoS attack for days, weeks, or months. At some 
point, a sustained DDoS attack becomes permanent, not merely temporary. 
Moreover, a sustained DDoS attack—or even one of more modest dura-
tion—can have effects that are irreversible and reasonably foreseeable as 
such. For example, a DDoS attack that has foreseeable collateral adverse 
effects on a financial network can generate opportunity costs that hurt in-
vestors or other stakeholders; individuals who lose the ability to trade stocks 
for a period of time can miss out on a chance to buy a stock that rapidly 
                                                                                                                      
97. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. at 56, ¶ 85. 
98. Id. at 56–57, ¶ 87 (expressly disclaiming decision on issue of reversibility). 
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increases in value, sell a stock whose value precipitously declines, or engage 
in short-selling to profit from a decline in share price. In the countermeasure 
context, such effects may in the aggregate be disproportionate. 
Moreover, just as a DDoS attack may be disproportionate, depending on 
the importance of the system affected, an attack on the functionality of an 
operating system is not necessarily disproportionate on the view taken in this 
article. The next Section explains that the cyber realm’s dynamic nature per-
mits inquiry on whether a prompt patch or other repairs will address the loss 
of functionality in a timely fashion.99 Prompt patching may entail infor-
mation from the victim State whose countermeasure is causing the loss in 
functionality. Suppose the State conducting the cyber operation provides in-
formation on restoring functionality directly to a State that has experienced 
the loss—for example, a neutral State that has experienced collateral dam-
age—or indirectly to a company that uses the affected software or an inter-
national organization set up for the purpose of restoring functionality. In 
that event, the timeliness and comprehensiveness of the information pro-
vided would reduce the harm that figures in the proportionality calculus. In 
proportionality under the jus in bello, a State’s willingness to provide a timely 
and comprehensive patch therefore relates to the quantum of harm to civil-
ians that is reasonably expected by those planning a countermeasure or in-
trusion. Of course, even a timely and comprehensive patch may not prevent 
irreversible harm, such as opportunity costs that arise from the loss of func-
tionality before the patch becomes effective. Those harms will continue to 
count toward proportionality. 
In sum, proportionality should generally consider duration and reversi-
bility together. Generally, a temporary countermeasure will best fit the pro-
portionality rule. Countermeasures that take longer to reverse are more likely 
to be disproportionate. After all, the effects of many kinetic attacks, includ-
ing bodily wounds and damage to property, may also be “reversible” given 
enough time, effort, money, and expertise. Actions causing such effects 
would exceed the use of force threshold, but the example above shows the 
folly of separating reversibility and duration.100 
 
                                                                                                                      
99. A patch is a change in software that will address a flaw or “vulnerability” that made 
the software susceptible to hacking. See Tim Ridout, Building a Comprehensive Strategy of Cyber 
Defense, Deterrence, and Resilience, 40 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS, Summer 2016, 
at 63, 70. 
100. I am indebted to Gary Brown for this point. 
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C. The Duty to Take Feasible Precautions: An Express or Implicit Duty 
 
This article argues that whenever proportionality, in each of its guises, is ap-
plicable, the duty to take feasible precautions also applies, either expressly or 
implicitly. The rule of precautions is express in the jus in bello,101 but also 
applies to the jus ad bellum and the law of countermeasures. As we shall see, 
the duty to take feasible precautions may either stand on its own, as an inde-
pendent substantive duty layered on top of proportionality, or may be evi-
dentiary in nature, demonstrating a State’s compliance with the rule of propor-
tionality. Both the substantive and evidentiary conceptions are important in 
the cyber domain because the need for speed often makes prompt action 
necessary, while also requiring feasible measures to mitigate the harm that 
speed could cause. 
Under the rule of precautions in IHL, a State must take all “feasible” 
steps to reduce civilian harm.102 A feasible step is one that is practicable, 
given resource constraints, technological limits, and tactical concerns, such 
as the importance of preserving certain means or instrumentalities of warfare 
(including weapons) for future engagements, and the disadvantage of dis-
closing certain advancements to adversaries or the world at large.103 A feasi-
ble step is not one that is merely possible; requiring a State to implement all 
possible steps would unduly burden commanders, undermining the crucial 
value of military necessity.104 But a definition of feasibility that imposed no 
duties on States would drain all meaning from the rule of precautions. 
At the intersection of technology and the rule of precautions in attack, 
resource constraints and tactical concerns recede over time. As the mass pro-
duction of any technology increases, it also becomes more widespread and 
less expensive. Moreover, knowledge of a once rare or closely-held technol-
ogy typically proliferates, as, for example, the capacity to construct and de-
ploy nuclear weapons increased from the time that the United States used 
nuclear weapons at the close of World War II to present. Decreased expense 
                                                                                                                      
101. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 57(2)(a)(ii); Corn, supra note 6, at 459; 
Geoffrey Corn & James A. Schoettler Jr., Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation: The Essential 
Role of Precautionary Measures, 223 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 785, 837 (2015); Jean-Francois 
Queguiner, Precautions under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities, 88 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 793, 797 (2006). 
102. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
103. See David A. Wallace & Shane R. Reeves, Protecting Critical Infrastructure in Cyber 
Warfare: Is It Time for States to Reassert Themselves?, 53 UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW 1607, 1635 
(2020). 
104. Cf. Schmitt, supra note 61. 
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and increased production ease resource constraints and tactical concerns, 
making it more feasible to deploy formerly new technology. 
The rise in technology that is evident in cyber and autonomy also makes 
precautions relevant in areas where they have not traditionally been salient, 
including countermeasures and the jus ad bellum. Technology highlights the 
need for speed—the importance of responding quickly to avoid greater dam-
age or disadvantage and to increase the probability that a given measure by 
a victim State will effectively repel an incursion and persuade the responsible 
State to cease its offending conduct.105 A victim State that is slow to respond 
encourages other States to violate international law, either with an armed 
attack that violates the jus ad bellum or with an action that violates the princi-
ple of sovereignty or constitutes an unlawful interference under the use of 
force threshold. However, the importance of speed in a response may also 
produce greater adverse impacts for the responsible State and for third party 
States. 
Here, the rule of precautions has a substantive role to play, not only in 
the jus in bello, but also in the jus ad bellum and countermeasures. Suppose a 
State can feasibly deploy technology to craft a timely, effective countermeas-
ure that is also more precise than other available responses. Given this as-
sumption, this article argues that the rule of precautions applies and that as 
a result, States have a duty to deploy that more tailored technology. 
Both the U.S. government and a spectrum of international law scholars 
have indicated support for a rule of precautions that would apply regarding 
the use of force, the conduct of hostilities, and countermeasures below the 
use of force threshold. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has 
indicated that even below the use of force threshold, a cyber operation 
“should not be conducted in a way that unnecessarily causes inconvenience 
to civilians or neutral persons.106 One distinguished commentator has criti-
cized this statement by the U.S. Department of Defense as lacking adequate 
support or as merely stating a U.S. policy preference rather than articulating 
a binding legal requirement.107 However, the U.S. Department of Defense’s 
                                                                                                                      
105. See Dan Saxon, A Human Touch: Autonomous Weapons, Directive 3000.09, and the “Ap-
propriate Levels of Human Judgment Over the Use of Force,” 15 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Summer/Fall 2014, at 100, 103–04. 
106. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL § 16.5.2 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016). 
107. See Gary D. Brown, Commentary on the Law of Cyber Operations and the DoD Law of 
War Manual, in THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL: 
COMMENTARY AND CRITIQUE 337, 346 (Michael A. Newton ed., 2018) (stating that military 
lawyers who rely on the DoD Law of War Manual “would be better served if the Manual 
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unqualified statement of a duty to avoid needless inconvenience to civilians 
through cyber operations is consistent with the substantive conception of 
precautions outlined here.108 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0’s International Group of Experts seems to en-
dorse such a role for precautions in countermeasures by citing the need to 
employ “considerable care” in crafting a proportionate countermeasure.109 
Indeed, the International Group of Experts suggest that prior to initiating 
countermeasures, a victim State must conduct a “full assessment” that in-
cludes “mapping the targeted system” and “reviewing relevant intelli-
gence.”110 As was argued earlier in this Part and is discussed further in the 
next Part, taking such precautions does not necessarily lock a victim State 
into a rigid time sequence. A State can engage in such precautions before an 
attack or other action by a responsible State. Indeed, a prudent State would 
continually acquire cyber, signals, and human intelligence about its adver-
saries. The key point is that States have a duty to take such measures where 
feasible to temper the State’s response or that response’s effects. The em-
phasis on such steps suggests that under international law countermeasures 
include a precautionary element.111 
Professor Michael Schmitt, the general editor of Tallinn Manual 2.0, re-
cently outlined a comparable view of the importance of precautions. Dis-
cussing contexts at or below the use of force threshold, Schmitt argued that 
as a matter of policy, States should not engage in cyber incursions in which 
“[the] expected concrete negative effects on . . . the civilian population are 
excessive relative to the [anticipated] concrete benefit.”112 Although this ad-
vice adopts the language of proportionality, it also suggests a role for pre-
cautions. 
                                                                                                                      
made clear this [avoiding unnecessary inconvenience to civilians or neutrals] is a US policy 
rather than the law,” which at most warranted placement in U.S. rules of engagement); see 
also Schmitt, supra note 55, at 349, 349 n.82 (describing the DoD Law of War Manual state-
ment as addressing policy). 
108. The analysis in this article supplies additional analytical support for the U.S. De-
partment of Defense position. 
109. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 128. 
110. Id. 
111. Perhaps the International Group of Experts suggestion here largely pertains to the 
evidentiary conception—proving that the State engaging in countermeasures relies on best 
practices to facilitate compliance with the rule of proportionality. However, one can also 
read the Tallinn Manual 2.0 analysis as recognizing that a substantive view of precautions is 
inherent in the requirement that countermeasures be proportionate. 
112. Schmitt, supra note 55, at 347. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To discern the role of precautions, suppose a State can reap a particular 
benefit with a cyber countermeasure at the cost of inconvenience to civilians 
at level X. Now suppose that the State can feasibly achieve the same benefit 
with a technological precaution that would reduce negative effects on civil-
ians to one-half X. If the State decides to proceed without employing the fea-
sible technological precaution—even though using the precaution would 
reap the same benefit—it is reasonable to view the difference between X and 
one-half X as “excessive.” Professor Schmitt’s description of the results of 
his balancing test supports this reading. For example, Professor Schmitt has 
noted that as a matter of policy a State should reject a cyber action that would 
yield significant civilian inconvenience when the expected benefit was “tri-
fling.”113 Such a State decision, according to Professor Schmitt, would seem 
petty and mean-spirited.114 Indeed, such a decision would not serve the cri-
terion of military necessity that interacts with the principle of humanity to 
form IHL’s crucial balance.115 At least when the cost of employing a feasible 
precaution is de minimis because of economies of scale, a failure to employ 
that precaution would similarly fail Professor Schmitt’s test. 
Moreover, even if precautions do not have the freestanding substantive 
significance in countermeasures that they possess in IHL—imposing duties 
beyond proportionality when added safety steps are “feasible”—precautions 
do have an evidentiary significance. Here, a State that takes precautions before 
engaging in countermeasures can cite those precautions as evidence that its 
response is proportionate. For example, suppose a victim State’s counter-
measure includes collateral damage to the responsible State’s systems or to 
neutral States that is more substantial in scale than the impact of the respon-
sible State’s initial action. As noted earlier, a State should receive a margin of 
appreciation that would cover modest increments beyond the initial action’s 
effects. Suppose, however, that a margin of appreciation is only available 
when the victim State has demonstrated good faith or even reasonable care. 
In that event, the victim State’s care in mapping the responsible State’s sys-
tem can constitute evidence that the victim State’s actions causing the addi-
tional damage were not intentional, knowing, or even negligent. In this sense, 
the good faith and due care that a victim State shows through the taking of 
precautions is probative evidence of compliance with international law. 
 
                                                                                                                      
113. Id. at 349. 
114. Id. (noting that such an incursion would “smack of mere maliciousness”). 
115. Id. 
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D. Summary 
 
This discussion has analyzed proportionality in the cyber domain in the con-
texts of the jus ad bellum and countermeasures. As noted in this Part, propor-
tionality is both functional and substantive. Analyzing proportionality in-
cludes assessing whether the proposed countermeasure will, (1) elicit com-
pliance with international law by the responsible State, and, (2) correspond 
with the importance, scale, and duration of the initial incursion. Under the 
view expressed here and supported by the Air Service Agreement arbitral award, 
a victim State has a margin of appreciation on the second criterion. Without 
that flexibility, a victim State facing rigid legal norms in an uncertain opera-
tional environment may choose a more modest response than the initial incur-
sion. That restricted response would not effectively signal to the responsible 
State that the latter should cease its violation of international law. This Part 
has also argued that in addition to being an independent requirement under 
IHL, the need to take feasible precautions is inherent in both the jus ad bellum 
and countermeasures. In each case, precautions have a substantive dimen-
sion, imposing additional duties even when a State has satisfied proportion-
ality, and evidentiary significance, demonstrating that the State has proce-
dures in place that will promote its compliance with the proportionality rule. 
 
IV. PRECAUTIONS IN THE USE OF AUTONOMOUS CYBERAGENTS 
 
Now that we have discussed the test for proportionality and made the case 
for an inherent rule of feasible precautions in the jus ad bellum and counter-
measures joining the express rule in the jus in bello, it is time to focus more 
specifically on the criteria guiding the rule of precautions. The use of auton-
omous agents in the cyber domain poses special challenges because of au-
tonomous agents’ brittleness, bias, and unintelligibility, as well as humans’ 
tendency toward automation bias.116 Lex lata has not yet caught up with the 
demands in this emerging arena. As such, the following discussion ventures 
into the venue of lex ferenda, although the discussion proceeds on the as-
                                                                                                                      
116. The U.S. Department of Defense has recognized the importance of these issues. 
See U.S. Defense Innovation Board, AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of 
Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense: Supporting Document 31–33 (2019), 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCI-
PLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF (discussing need to combat bias); id. at 33–38 
(discussing the need to understand data inputs and review outputs for autonomous agents). 
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sumption that norms will move in this direction. By way of criteria for pre-
cautions, the article suggests four pillars: reconnaissance, coordination, re-
pairs, and review. I address each in turn. 
 
A. Reconnaissance and the Imperative of Espionage 
 
While espionage and reconnaissance are mainstays of State behavior during 
peace and during war, this article goes further by arguing that intelligence 
collection, including espionage, is not merely permitted but required in the use 
of autonomous cyberagents. That requirement extends not merely to the jus 
in bello, which mandates consideration of “reasonably available” information 
in targeting decisions,117 but also to the jus ad bellum and countermeasures. In 
the cyber realm, intelligence collection—which I refer to as reconnais-
sance—will often be virtual.118 But on occasion, human aid to assist such 
efforts is necessary for their success—as in the case of human insertion of a 
thumb drive to introduce a worm for exfiltration of data.119 In such situa-
tions, and where feasible, the approach taken here would require such human 
aid. 
Virtual reconnaissance, supplemented as needed by human and signals 
methods of collection, is necessary to ensure that autonomous cyberagents 
comply with international law. Without the capacity to map an adversary’s 
network and associated systems,120 an autonomous cyberagent will be “flying 
blind,” and will lack the ability to accurately target adversaries or avoid ex-
cessive collateral damage. As noted above, waiting until after an attack or 
other action has occurred will often hinder an effective response in each of 
the contexts examined here, including the jus ad bellum and countermeasures, 
as well as the jus in bello. Because of the need for speed, collecting cyber in-
telligence on potential adversaries before an attack will often be the only way 
to ensure that a response is both effective and tailored to avoid needless 
harm. Without that precaution, the brittleness and bias of autonomous 
                                                                                                                      
117. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE 
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.3.4 (2004). 
118. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 168. Militaries often refer to the gathering 
of information as encompassing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. See Michael 
N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The Decline of International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the 
Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 180, 210–11 (2015). Purely 
for ease of reference, this article uses the term “reconnaissance” to connote the full range 
of intelligence collection, including espionage. 
119. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 171. 
120. Id. at 128. 
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agents will produce errors that both reduce the reasonably anticipated bene-
fits of the attack or countermeasure and increase the harms that a reasonable 
decisionmaker would expect. 
Under the substantive conception of precautions outlined in the previ-
ous Section, these concerns about foreseeably reduced benefits and in-
creased harms dictate that when prior collection through reconnaissance—
including espionage—is feasible, it is required. Tallinn Manual 2.0 recognized 
that international law does not bar espionage, per se, including monitoring 
and exfiltrating data.121 This Article goes further by suggesting that the duty 
to take feasible precautions inherent in the law of countermeasures includes 
a duty to undertake espionage, where the latter is feasible. 
When a victim State used reconnaissance as well as the other steps sug-
gested below—such as coordination, review, and repair—under an eviden-
tiary view of precautions such measures would be presumptive evidence of 
proportionality, entitling a victim State to a margin of appreciation. On the 
other hand, suppose that reconnaissance is not feasible, and that in its ab-
sence a victim State cannot be reasonably certain that an autonomous cyber-
agent will be sufficiently precise to avoid excessive harm. Under the eviden-
tiary view of precautions, use of the agent despite this concern would pro-
vide a basis to infer that the victim State had violated the rule of proportion-
ality. 
An example will be helpful. Suppose that Arcadia implants malware in 
various government networks of Pacifica. The malware has autonomous ca-
pabilities: it has been trained both to observe Pacifica’s networks and react 
to particular inputs from those networks. Suppose further that Arcadia’s au-
tonomous malware receives inputs indicating that Pacifica has just com-
menced an attack on Arcadia’s networks. Based on inputs about the opera-
tion of Pacifica’s networks that Arcadia’s malware has already gathered, Ar-
cadia’s autonomous cyberagent will be able to launch corresponding attacks 
on Pacifica’s networks, echoing the scale, scope, duration, and importance 
of the attacks on Arcadia. Without the autonomous malware already in place, 
Arcadia would have had to “start from scratch” in both attributing and re-
sponding to the attack. Absent the autonomous cyberagent that Arcadia had 
already implanted in Pacifica’s networks, Arcadia might have mistakenly at-
tributed the attacks to another rival, Ruritania. By virtue of the malware it 
had previously implanted, Arcadia has the capacity to both correctly attribute 
the attacks to Pacifica and respond appropriately. If placing malware in 
                                                                                                                      
121. Id. at 168–69. 
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Pacifica’s networks is feasible, this would be a necessary precaution on Ar-
cadia’s part.122 
To flip the hypothetical, suppose that such placement was not feasible 
and Arcadia could not reasonably find that a newly introduced autonomous 
agent would provide the benefit that Arcadia anticipated and avoid excessive 
foreseeable harm to both Pacifica and Ruritania. In that event, Arcadia’s use 
of the new agent would presumptively violate the rule of proportionality, 
with a finding of culpability hinging on the actual damage to Pacifica and 
Ruritania’s networks. 
Use of feasible reconnaissance—including espionage—as a necessary 
precaution in both a substantive and evidentiary sense would be required 
even if the reconnaissance involved a physical intrusion into the territory of 
another State. For example, suppose that Arcadia could implant its autono-
mous cyberagent only through the use of a human agent who would insert a 
thumb-drive containing malware into a computer within Pacifica. Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 did not reach a definitive conclusion on whether the use of a 
human agent on Pacifica territory would constitute an illegal violation of 
Pacifica’s sovereignty.123 In this respect, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 International 
Group of Experts left open the possibility that Arcadia’s action could be 
unlawful. The approach taken here takes a different path. It would clearly 
hold that espionage of this kind is entirely lawful, despite its location on 
Pacifica territory.124 
On this view, espionage—as long as it merely involves exfiltration of 
data—is an international public good: an activity that disseminates knowledge 
about each State’s capabilities and defenses and thus facilitates accurate cyber 
responses both at and below the use of force threshold. For the same reason, 
under the substantive and evidentiary conceptions of precautions advanced 
here, espionage with a territorial component is—where feasible—not only 
permitted, but required, at least if no other mode of reconnaissance will pro-
mote an autonomous cyberagent’s reasonably accurate assessment of ex-
pected benefits and harms. 
                                                                                                                      
122. If Pacifica detected Arcadia’s malware and removed it, Arcadia would be required 
to deploy the “next generation” of malware, if that step were feasible. 
123. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, at 171. 
124. See Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VIRGINIA 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 291, 302 (2015) (suggesting that the permissibility of 
espionage informs the contours of sovereignty); see also David A. Wallace, Amy H. McCarthy 
& Mark Visger, Peeling Back the Onion of Cyber Espionage After Tallinn 2.0, 87 MARYLAND LAW 
REVIEW 205, 222–28 (2019) (discussing disagreements within the group of experts who 
convened to draft Tallinn Manual 2.0). 
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B. Coordination of Autonomous Methods 
 
The brittleness and bias of autonomous agents, in addition to requiring in-
creased reconnaissance, also mandates expanded coordination. By coordina-
tion, this article refers to the use of different autonomous methods simulta-
neously or in close succession to refine outputs.125 The interaction of differ-
ent modes acts as a check on agents’ errors. A model with a particular 
strength or training in specific data can blunt the impact of arbitrary or biased 
outputs from other models with different strengths and training. Working 
together, coordinated models can perform more functions without gaps or 
mistakes.126 
In cyber, coordination amounts to an autonomous “red team.” Just as a 
“red team” makes better human decisions by posing objections and present-
ing alternatives, the autonomous equivalent lowers the risk of false positives 
while ensuring that attribution is precise.127 The autonomous use of coordi-
nation aids greatly in both detecting anomalies and misuse in networks that 
may signal a cyber intrusion.  
Many autonomous models build coordination into their approach, in-
cluding two or more methods. For example, ensemble learning simultane-
ously applies a suite of hypotheses about inputs.128 Each “learner”—that is, 
each discrete machine that analyzes a given set of inputs—generates a 
“weak” hypothesis, which operators define as a hypothesis about data that 
                                                                                                                      
125. See SCHARRE, supra note 1, at 20–21; STUART RUSSELL, HUMAN COMPATIBLE: AR-
TIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL (2019) (discussing the im-
portance of checks on the outputs of any single autonomous learner). 
126. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 29, at 1005; DOMINGOS, supra note 29, at 238. 
127. Anna L. Buczak & Ethan Guven, A Survey of Data Mining and Machine Learning 
Methods for Cyber Security Intrusion Detection, 18 IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TU-
TORIALS 1153, 1162–70 (2016), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber 
=7307098; see generally Mark Raymond, Engaging Security and Intelligence Practitioners in the Emerg-
ing Cyber Regime Complex, 1 CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW, Fall 2016, at 81, 92 (discussing human 
red-teaming in the cyber arena); U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION, supra note 21, 
at 22 (discussing red-teaming of preliminary policy proposals to identify their weaknesses). 
On issues of attribution in cyber incursions, see DENNIS BROEDERS, ELS DE BUSSER & 
PATRYK PAWLAK, THE HAGUE PROGRAM FOR CYBER NORMS, THREE TALES OF ATTRIB-
UTION IN CYBERSPACE: CRIMINAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY DEBATES 7–8 
(2020), https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/research/research-output/governance-and-
global-affairs/three-tales-of-attribution-in-cyberspace.-criminal-law-international-law-and-
policy-debates; Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution, 
17 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 229 (2012). 
128. Buczak & Guven, supra note 127, at 1164–65. 
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is imperfect, but performs better than a random prediction. Ensemble learn-
ing then combines each of the better-than-random predictions to generate a 
more robust hypothesis. That robust hypothesis will yield outputs that avoid 
the arbitrary results fostered by any one approach’s tendency toward brittle-
ness and bias. In assessing and attributing cyber intrusions, for example, an 
ensemble learning method or other approach demonstrating coordination 
would separate out false positives. As currently used in spam detection meth-
ods, a coordinated agent would distinguish phishing attempts from bona fide 
emails as well cyber initiatives from friendly or neutral States from malicious 
incursions by adversaries. 
The coordination factor described here is not prescriptive regarding a 
particular autonomous methodology—the ensemble learning approach de-
scribed above is merely an illustration. Coordination’s core is an autonomous 
capability to conduct different inquiries of inputs simultaneously or in tight 
succession, to test preliminary hypotheses rapidly, and to weed out the ef-
fects of brittleness and bias. A State that has deployed an autonomous cyber-
agent with this coordination capability has checked another box in the pre-
cautionary matrix. 
As an example, suppose that in our implanted malware hypothetical, Ar-
cadia had planted malware in Pacifica’s government software, but Pacifica—
suspecting that Arcadia or other States had done this—had taken steps to 
throw them off the track. To accomplish this, Pacifica had deployed “adver-
sarial examples” in visual representations of government departments as well 
as in code itself—changing digits in unused code spaces for the particular 
purpose of deceiving autonomous cyberagents from other States.129 Further 
suppose that Pacifica then launched a cyber intrusion against Arcadia below 
the use of force threshold. If the adversarial example was effective, one Ar-
cadian autonomous cyberagent might not be able to discern the difference 
between a network used by a Pacifica government agency and a civilian net-
work. 
                                                                                                                      
129. See Rouhani et al., supra note 37, at 34–35. Use of adversarial examples to muddy 
an attacker’s ability to distinguish between military and civilian objects might violate a de-
fender’s duty to take precautions under IHL. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 
58(c); Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Defender Duties under International Hu-
manitarian Law, 11 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 425, 432–36 (2011); Eric 
Talbot Jensen, Precautions against the Effects of Attacks in Urban Areas, 98 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 147, 156–57 (2016) (explaining the defender’s obligation to 
take feasible precautions to lower the risk of harm to civilians on territory within its control). 
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To ensure a proportional response, Arcadia would have to deploy en-
semble learning or another coordinated model.130 Pacifica’s adversarial ex-
amples might well fool Arcadia if the latter State had only used one autono-
mous method. In contrast, using a coordinated model incorporating two or 
more disparate methods would greatly increase the accuracy and reliability 
of Arcadia’s targeting and reduce the likelihood that Pacifica’s use of adver-
sarial examples would cloak its responsible network from an Arcadian coun-
termeasure.131 Fooling one method is certainly possible, but fooling two or 
more methods is far more challenging, particularly if one of those methods 
is trained to spot changes in the cyber topography that could be evidence of 
adversarial deployment. Indeed, Pacifica might be less willing to try its luck 
with an initial incursion, thus promoting greater compliance with interna-
tional law. 
Coordination like this is nothing new in a State or commander’s lexicon. 
Commanders regularly use a range of inputs from intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance, and strive to weigh disparate inputs in a balanced fash-
ion to reduce the chance of reliance on a single flawed source. Redundancy 
is also a common feature of automotive and aircraft software, weapons sys-
tems, and other advanced technology.132 The coordination criterion merely 
builds on this foundation. 
In the Boeing 737 Max incidents, the operation of a single sensor exag-
gerated the risk of a stall and thus triggered a downward plunge in the air-
craft’s nose that resulted in two catastrophic crashes.133 Additional sensors 
would have more readily detected ambiguous information, suggesting that a 
stall was not imminent and that automatic depression of the aircraft’s nose 
was not necessary. That redundancy in autonomous systems is one way that 
victim States can properly gauge connections between systems in States re-
sponsible for initial actions, thus ensuring that countermeasures minimize 
harm to unrelated systems in the responsible State. 
One objection to coordination might be that coordinating different 
methods will consume more time, hindering an efficient response. But that 
                                                                                                                      
130. Rouhani et al., supra note 37, at 34–35. 
131. Id. 
132. See Andre Kohn, Rolf Schneider, Antonio Vilela, Udo Dannebaum & Andreas 
Herkersdorf, Markov Chain-based Reliability Analysis for Automotive Fail-Operational Systems, 5 
SAE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TRANSPORTATION SAFETY 30, 32 (2017). Fail-safe ca-
pabilities are a common feature of advanced systems. These features minimize risk in the 
event of malfunction. 
133. Hamby, supra note 53. 
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is not necessarily true. Autonomous agents excel at implementing tasks 
quickly, and Moore’s Law suggests that the speed of applications will in-
crease exponentially.134 Any decrease in speed is likely to be minor and tem-
porary, with timely response becoming increasingly frequent as engineers 
work out any initial glitches. The accuracy and reliability of coordination will 
also improve. Over time, rapid coordination will become increasingly feasi-
ble, leaving States that fail to take this course as outliers. 
 
C. Repairs: A Patch in Time 
 
As another modification that is appropriate for the cyber domain, the ap-
proach taken in this article requires—where feasible—that a State assist in 
repairs of collateral damage caused by autonomous cyberagents. In the cyber 
arena, a patch may often remedy damage quickly, in contrast with the time-
consuming physical repairs that may be required for the effects of kinetic 
attacks. Suppose that a victim State’s response has caused collateral harm to 
third-party States or unrelated or civilian networks in a responsible State. If 
the victim State can feasibly provide a timely and effective patch, the ap-
proach to precautions taken here would require that action. In addition, if 
the collateral harm fell below the use of force threshold, the law of counter-
measures would require that—again, where feasible—the victim State pro-
vide a patch as part of its duty to ensure that the effects of countermeasures 
are both temporary and reversible. 
In an armed conflict or even peacetime cyber exchanges with adversary 
States, sharing patches may be more difficult. For example, the United States 
may be wary of sharing software patches with adversaries such as Russia and 
China. In these situations, an international organization might be needed as 
an intermediary. Of course, IHL already uses trusted intermediaries for mat-
ters such as providing aid to civilians in war zones. Organizations analogous 
to the International Committee of the Red Cross or Doctors Without Bor-
ders could be established to act as clearinghouses for patching information. 
While sharing information may still not be practicable in such situations, the 
                                                                                                                      
134. Lee Bell, What is Moore’s Law? WIRED Explains the Theory that Defined the Tech 
Industry, WIRED, Aug. 28, 2016, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/wired-explains-moor 
es-law (noting that according to the theory, originally expounded in 1965, that because of 
decreasing transistor size, the number of transistors per square inch of chip would double 
approximately every twelve months (now every twenty-four months)). 
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evanescence of vulnerabilities once used should encourage more infor-
mation sharing, much as States share information with international health 
and humanitarian groups.135 
As an example, suppose that Arcadia has used malware as part of a cyber 
countermeasure responding to an intrusion by Pacifica, but in the process 
impaired the functionality of software in Ruritania. Arcadia promptly 
acknowledged responsibility for the harm to Ruritania, and provided a patch 
that restored the functionality of adversely affected operating systems. As-
suming that Arcadia incurred no substantial costs through this action that 
might have reduced its feasibility, the approach to precautions taken in this 
article would require that Arcadia provide the patch to Ruritania. Further-
more, while prompt provision of an effective patch would not completely 
remove the harm to Ruritania from the proportionality calculus applicable 
to countermeasures, it would reduce the quantum of harm used in this cal-
culus. 
 
D. Review: Unpacking the Unintelligible 
 
In assessing how reconnaissance, coordination, and repairs have performed, 
review is essential. In IHL, review is part of a State’s duty to exhibit “con-
stant care” in reducing needless harm to civilians.136 Proportionality in the jus 
ad bellum and countermeasures also requires review. A State that has engaged 
in a methodical review of past operations inspires trust that it will learn the 
right lessons from previous mistakes. That review should be independent to 
avoid the groupthink that can undermine neutral evaluation. Moreover, re-
view in the autonomous cyber context depends on a State ensuring that its 
agents’ outputs are sufficiently explainable to facilitate review. 
In the jus in bello, review of a weapon starts prior to deployment with 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, which requires a finding that a weapon 
is not inherently indiscriminate.137 Article 36 reviews have a low threshold: a 
                                                                                                                      
135. Of the steps suggested here, the provision of repairs is both the least practicable 
and the greatest departure from the lex lata. It may be useful to consider State commitment 
to the three other steps outlined here—reconnaissance, coordination, and review—as an 
alternative approach that would still yield a margin of appreciation. 
136. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 57(1). 
137. Id. art. 36; see also WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 347–48 (2d ed. 2016); Michael W. Meier, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
(LAWS): Conducting a Comprehensive Weapons Review, 30 TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND COM-
PARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 119, 124–26 (2016). Even if an autonomous cyberagent passes a 
weapons review, designers will need to validate its use for particular purposes. Cf. Margaret 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
438 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State need only find that some use of a weapon is consistent with IHL. For 
example, if a State can show that in a particular context, it can use a weapon 
to target an adversary’s force, that weapon has met the requirements of Ar-
ticle 36. Review under Article 36 is vital where this duty applies, but it is 
more limited than the concept of review advanced here. First, a State’s use 
of cyber may not be a weapon in the Article 36 sense of the term.138 Second, 
Article 36 does not apply to countermeasures or other actions taken outside 
armed conflicts. Third, review here stems from the concept of after-action 
review in IHL.  
After-action review in IHL and provisions for review under international 
human rights law (IHRL)139 are more expansive in scope than pre-deploy-
ment Article 36 review. Because the combination of cyber and autonomy is 
so new, a review should be systemic, not merely focused on a specific inci-
dent. A State investigating an alleged war crime by one of its service members 
has no duty to consider whether it should forego the use of humans in future 
military engagements. The use of humans is sufficiently well established to 
render any such inquiry unnecessary. In contrast, depending on the serious-
ness of the outcomes, the novel technology of autonomous cyberagents may 
require a more searching review of the appropriateness of their deployment.  
Such reviews entail a more robust form of independence than the fact-
specific detachment required under customary IHL.140 Under the lex lata, an 
investigation of alleged war crimes is sufficiently independent if it does not 
suffer from command influence that skews the investigation’s analysis and 
conclusions. However, IHRL has been moving toward a more robust con-
ception that requires greater structural independence from the chain of com-
mand.141 
Under the approach taken in this article, a more robust structural ap-
proach would be required in IHL—recognizing the move in that direction 
in State practice—and in the jus ad bellum and countermeasures. Moreover, 
as a functional matter, the novelty and complexity of autonomous cyber-
                                                                                                                      
Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 773, 
812–16 (2015) (urging the use of a rigorous test to validate machine learning models). 
138. See Jeffrey T. Biller & Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Op-
erations as Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 179 
(2019). 
139. Michael N. Schmitt, Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed Conflict, 2 
HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 31, 80 (2011). 
140. Id. at 50–51. 
141. Id. at 49–51. 
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agents counsel for such robust safeguards. In particular, while military com-
manders may well have exceptional expertise at their disposal, mobilizing 
expertise for reviews of agents’ performance may require access to civilian 
developers and engineers. Indeed, civilian expert input may be necessary to 
ensure that a review is effective, which both IHL and IHRL also require.142 
Reviewers need a working knowledge of a technology to competently ana-
lyze where an action may have gone wrong. Without such analysis, an inves-
tigation will lack the effectiveness that international law demands.143 On the 
other hand, a record of careful review would be one aspect of persuasive 
evidence that a State had complied with international law. 
Reviews must include efforts to explain the outputs of autonomous 
agents. As noted earlier, explainability is a challenge for certain forms of ar-
tificial intelligence. In particular, neural networks generate outputs that are 
difficult to explain through conventional verbal means, since the layers that 
contribute to neural networks’ accuracy sift through so many variables. To 
accommodate this concern, reviewers will need to define explainability more 
broadly, while ensuring that reviews are rigorous. 
A broader conception of explainability would be multi-pronged and en-
tail the machine coordination discussed above. One approach would be 
functional, seeking to clearly identify the interaction between inputs and out-
puts. This approach would use counterfactuals by varying a range of inputs 
and studying the outputs that the agent produced.144 In coordination with 
other autonomous agents, such reviews would seek to isolate the mix of var-
iables that yielded a decision that violated international law. If an agent 
weighted one variable too heavily, designers would retrain the agent using 
revised training data that diminished this variable’s role. In addition, design-
ers are working on agents that can express a neural network’s outputs 
                                                                                                                      
142. Id. at 80. Here, too, Professor Schmitt suggests that context should be determina-
tive, and that the “complexity of the matter” should drive the scope, structure, and operation 
of the particular investigation. The approach taken in this article would vary from Professor 
Schmitt’s approach only in making the ex ante decision that the complexity of autonomous 
cyberagents requires a greater measure of independence, at least until “proof of concept” 
has taken hold and a State has resolved systemic issues. 
143. Not every incident requires review. To require investigation, an incident must en-
tail at least a colorable violation of international law. See id. at 79. 
144. Lipton, supra note 13, at 6; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 29, at 692; Sandra Wachter, 
Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box: 
Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 841, 
881–83 (2018). For further discussion, see supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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through other more intelligible methods, such as decision trees that graph-
ically depict factors that contribute to a decision. Once designers have cre-
ated a decision tree that matches a neural network’s outputs, the designers 
can “prune” the tree, cutting off irrelevant branches. Pruning can also yield 
a better mix of training data. 
A workable conception of review should recognize that there are many 
ways of enhancing explainability and addressing errors. Moreover, a State 
should be able to show that it is continually working on more effective means 
for addressing this concern. Commitment to a reasonable framework of re-
view is more productive than prescribing or prohibiting a particular technol-
ogy. 
In our malware hypothetical, a review might be required to determine 
the cause of mistakes and seek to correct tactics, techniques, and procedures 
in the future. For example, suppose that Arcadia had used malware embed-
ded in Pacifica’s networks to respond to a Pacifica incursion, but that mal-
ware had targeted civilian networks in a fashion that manifestly violated the 
jus in bello, jus ad bellum, or the rule of proportionality in countermeasures. 
Arcadia would be required to conduct a review to determine the cause of its 
mistake and discern means to avoid comparable mistakes in the future. Con-
ducting that review would entail the capacity to discern why the agent made 
a mistake. For example, designers reviewing the agent’s performance could 
seek to reverse-engineer that performance with counterfactuals to determine 
what inputs or architecture would have to change to secure a different result. 
Upon review, designers could determine that they needed to use more 
elaborate coordination between autonomous learners to detect potential er-
rors and modify the agent’s outputs before they created harm. Under the 
approach taken here, designers would then have to implement the findings 
of their review. That dedication to review would diminish brittleness, bias, 
and unintelligibility and facilitate continual improvement in compliance with 
international law. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In the cyber realm, where the need for speed is paramount, observing pro-
portionality is crucial. Human designers and operators lack the agility to re-
spond to ever-mounting cyber incursions. Autonomous cyberagents can ad-
dress that need. 
In the jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and the law of countermeasures, propor-
tionality plays an important role in reducing harm and the risk of escalation. 
 
 
 
Autonomous Cyber Capabilities Vol. 96 
441 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the amorphous character of proportionality makes it difficult to 
implement across each of the legal arenas described above. Attributes of au-
tonomy also hinder that mission. Along with their extraordinary speed and 
analytical prowess, autonomous agents have notable flaws, including brittle-
ness, bias, and unintelligibility. Beset by automation bias, human designers 
and operators struggle to accept and address these flaws. 
Unduly burdening victim States is no answer to autonomy’s deficits. In 
decisions about the use of force, the conduct of armed conflict, and the 
launching of countermeasures, overly onerous restrictions will force victim 
States to cede the initiative to first movers who violate international law in 
search of an advantage. States will reject any legal duty that yields this per-
verse result. A balance that encompasses the need for speed in victim State 
responses while ensuring that those responses remain within reasonable 
bounds is both desirable and necessary. 
The approach taken in this article seeks to accomplish that goal. It con-
fers a margin of appreciation on victim States’ responses. However, that mar-
gin of appreciation requires victim States to observe feasible precautions. 
Those precautions have both independent substantive significance as a com-
ponent of proportionality and evidentiary value as proof of a victim State’s 
compliance with international law. Necessary precautions are reconnais-
sance, coordination, repair, and review. Fulfilling those conditions will allow 
victim States to wrest the initiative from the offending States while keeping 
their own responses in check. That balance will preserve stability in the cyber 
domain and the international order, while also complying with international 
law. 
 
